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Abstract. This article examines whether Willard Van Orman Quine’s 
indeterminacy thesis can be sustained. The argument from above, Quine argues, 
can derive indeterminacy as its conclusion. I will argue that the indeterminacy 
claim cannot be sustained. I further argue that Quine changed the formulation of the 
underdetermination of theory by evidence (UTE) argument from what Duhem said 
to the Quine/Pierce meaning verification view, in order use the new formulation 
of UTE to imply indeterminacy. Given all that, we see when we apply the old 
UTE argument we only arrive at underdetermination of theory by evidence, and 
that applies to all sciences, philosophy and knowledge, including philosophy of 
language. 
Quine’s argument of indeterminacy is one where the premises alone do not 
make the conclusion obvious, and further difficulty arises because he has not given 
enough examples of the indeterminacy in his writings. Given that, I will look at how 
can we draw the particular conclusion Quine maintains on the basis of the single 
fundamental premise he puts forward, bearing in mind Quine’s other philosophical 
views and background beliefs. I will look at further ways of approaching the 
indeterminacy argument, through which I shall try to examine whether Quine’s 
premise can derive the conclusion of indeterminacy, examining the role of the 
underdetermination of theories by evidence in the argument from above, and its 
relation to the indeterminacy thesis. 
Keywords: Ontological relativity; Indeterminacy; Underdetermination of theory 
by evidence; Theory of meaning; Quine; Argument from above.
Introduction
My intention of this article is to examine whether Willard Van Orman Quine’s 
indeterminacy thesis (Quine, 1960) can be sustained. Further to examine the argu-
ment from above1) as given by Quine can derive indeterminacy as its conclusion 
as Quine argued. However, this is not as straightforward as its sounds, for Quine’s 
argument of indeterminacy is one where the premises alone do not make the con-
clusion obvious, and further difficulty arises because he has not given enough ex-
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amples of the indeterminacy in his writings. Given that, I will look at how we can 
draw the particular conclusion Quine maintains on the basis of the single funda-
mental premise he puts forward, bearing in mind Quine’s other philosophical views 
and background beliefs. 
To proceed with this, first I will present Quine’s argument for indeterminacy 
through those of his writings which focus upon the indeterminacy of translation 
thesis. Then, I look at further ways of approaching the indeterminacy argument, 
through which I shall try to examine whether the argument from above can derive 
the conclusion of indeterminacy. In doing this we shall look at the role of the under-
determination of theories by evidence in the argument from above, and its relation 
to the indeterminacy thesis. We look at whether these two arguments, underdetermi-
nation and indeterminacy, are compatible, and can be used in one argument for the 
indeterminacy conclusion. If they are not compatible, why not?  We will also look 
at some suggested links between Quine’s other views and the indeterminacy thesis: 
if the conclusion of the argument for indeterminacy is not implied by its premise, 
then what other possible assumptions might Quine have made in constructing the 
thesis? The nature of such an addition will be controversial, as it must depend, as 
we shall see, upon disputable interpretations of Quine’s other views and commit-
ments on topics such as physicalism, behaviorism, remnants of logical positivism, 
holism, etc.; an argument of this form, with a strong and much disputed conclusion, 
gives rise to a variety of interpretations and a host of platitudes.  My conclusion is 
that Quine’s indeterminacy of translation as it is given in the argument from above 
cannot be sustained. 
Section one: Quine indeterminacy thesis in a nutshell
In ‘Word and Object’ (1960)2) Quine put the thesis of indeterminacy of transla-
tion in this way:
“the infinite totality of sentences of any given speaker’s language can be so 
permuted, or mapped onto itself, that (a) the totality of the speaker’s dispositions 
to verbal behaviour remains invariant, and yet (b) the mapping is no mere correla-
tion of sentences with equivalent sentences, in any plausible sense of equivalence 
however loose.” And: “manuals for translating one language into another can be 
set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet 
incompatible with one another”3) 
Some might see this as a mere linguistic view about translations between lan-
guages, but the claim Quine makes here holds much more. Though Quine uses 
translation as a vehicle to convey his view, his claim is not directed solely at trans-
lations between different languages. Quine’s claim is about the theory of meaning 
in general. Indeterminacy theory is specifically directed at attempts to construct 
formal semantic meaning in natural languages which demands a precise scientific 
theory of linguistic meaning based upon evidence. It is very strong claim and I shall 
267
Social Indeterminacy and Quine’s Indeterminacy...
discuss whether it can be sustained, but, one does not need to endorse it to see the 
point Quine wants to make. Further, it moderates attempts to make extreme claims 
based on the fixed notion of culture across history and individuals. This can be ap-
plied in relation to any given classifications of locality, ‘original’ cultures, and multi 
cultures, intercultural, and so on. 
In order to have a formal semantic theory of meaning4), we need to have a theory 
determining references: the reference of a sentence is determined by the reference 
of its parts (terms, expressions, words used in the sentence). Quine’s claim, in a 
nutshell, is that the reference of these parts is not fixed, and the evidence cannot 
uniquely determine the truth of one theory over its rivals.  He concludes that the 
meaning is indeterminate. I shall explain his argument in detail.
In ‘Word and Object’ Quine introduces his ‘Gavagai’ argument, as a thought 
experiment in radical translation, in order to show the inscrutability of reference 
of terms, and in his later paper ‘On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation’ 
(Quine, 1970), he uses this as a first premise in the argument of the indetermina-
cy of translation. In ‘Ontological Relativity and Other Essays’ (Quine, 1969), he 
says that radical translation begins at home, and that the inscrutability of reference 
applies in the same way in the home language5, but to see the picture realistically 
requires a switch to radical translation. Quine uses radical translation as an infer-
ential process, starting from behavioural evidence alone, in order to exclude the 
following: semantic information, use of linguistic concepts, and any information on 
people’s beliefs and meanings. Therefore, we start without prior knowledge of the 
language we want to translate. The aim is to set up a unique and correct manual for 
translation (or formal semantic theory of meaning). We must do this in such a way 
as to preserve meanings, and meaning is presented as an undefined notion. 
The thought experiment of radical translation given by the ‘Gavagai’ example 
is about the reference of terms. In this procedure, we associate meanings to terms, 
and, because terms have their meaning as a part of a sentence in which they appear, 
Quine accordingly chooses the one-word sentence ‘Gavagai’ in an unknown nat-
ural language to be matched with its one word English sentence synonym. Quine 
gives preference to these sorts of sentences in the example, for they are also (most 
importantly) observation sentences, as opposed to standing (non- observation or 
theoretical) sentences. One reason for this is that Quine restricts the available ev-
idence to the native’s utterances and her current observable circumstances. He 
chooses observation sentences because they are ‘occasion sentences’: sentences 
which are assented to, or dissented from depending on the occasion of utterance, 
and which are closely connected to the observable circumstances. We try to match 
the observation sentence of one language with its synonym in another. We can have 
synonyms when, and only when, the two observation sentences convey the same 
meaning. Because sentences get their meaning holistically, as bundles of sentences, 
rather than as individual sentences, we have to map the totality of the sentences 
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by preserving the relation of inference between these sentences. We preserve this 
relation between the sentences within any language too, and we have to preserve it 
when we (translate or) compare between any two languages, or more.
In his much later paper, ‘On the Reason for Indeterminacy of Translation’ 
(Quine, 1970) Quine said that the ‘Gavagai’ argument was meant to establish the 
inscrutability of reference of terms. Quine then gives two ways to argue for the in-
determinacy claim, the argument from below and the argument from above.6)  The 
inscrutability of reference of terms (‘Gavagai’ argument) is used as a first premise 
in the argument from below. To outline again the fundamental idea which is shown 
by the ‘Gavagai’ argument: given the procedures of radical translation, and only the 
behavioural evidence, we are to translate the unknown native language onto ours. 
The argument for the indeterminacy of translation can be mounted in two ways7) 
Quine argued: the argument from above, and the argument from below. The argu-
ment from above, we can now say, is given as a real ground for indeterminacy; and 
the underdetermination of theory by evidence is given as a fundamental premise 
in this argument. Quine granted us that indeterminacy is derived from UTE (The 
underdetermination of theory by evidence). 
Section two: On the fundamental premise in the argument 
Quine has given UTE as a fundamental premise in his argument for the inde-
terminacy thesis, let’s examine this premise. The idea of UTE thesis emerged from 
the theory-ladenness argument, known as the Duhem-Quine argument. However, 
it is disputed whether what Quine thought agrees with Duhem’s claim, and if so, 
how much of the Duhem/Quine thesis can be attributed to Duhem. What we cannot 
dispute is that both Duhem’s and Quine’s arguments are directed against a certain 
notion of empiricism, but in different ways.
Duhem’s claim is that all observations are theory-laden (Duhem, 1914). Du-
hem’s argument8) proceeded by criticizing the empiricists’ claim that the meaning 
of observational terms is not problematic, as opposed to the meaning of theoretical 
terms. The meanings of theoretical terms were taken to be problematic by empiri-
cism because theoretical terms refer to things that cannot be encountered in expe-
rience, they refer to unobservables. Since the empiricists’ main claim in this area 
is that experience is the sole source of empirical knowledge, they have, therefore, 
tied meaningful empirical discourse to the possibility of experiential verification.
On this view, the empiricists argued that, knowledge of unobservable entities 
is unattainable. What this meant to science is that scientific theories are meaning-
less. Any scientific theory posits a number of unobservable entities and mecha-
nisms which are not directly accessible in experience. Where the language used 
in science is concerned, this view about science led to an eliminative semantic 
instrumentalism, which says that all assertions involving theoretical terms can 
be meaningful or have truth if they can be translated or reduced into assertions 
269
Social Indeterminacy and Quine’s Indeterminacy...
involving only observational terms9). The outcome of this was instrumentalism 
(Dewey, 1984 & Popper, 1935).10)
The distinction between Quine’s thesis and Duhem’s thesis can be established 
from the following points in their arguments: Duhem argued, we posit the unob-
servable entities in science (such as electrons, for instance); he holds that these 
entities are real, he also recognized that scientific theories are linked to observation 
holistically, and not sentence by sentence. Quine takes observation sentences to be 
connected with experience directly, and non-observation sentences are connected 
with experience indirectly and holistically. Quine develops his view in the ‘Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism’ (Quine, 1951), in the context of his argument to deny the 
analytic and synthetic distinction.  This was not an issue for Duhem, who wrote 
in the context of discussions about ‘The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory’ 
(Duhem, 1914). All of these points can be used to draw some sort of distinction 
between Duhem’s and Quine’s arguments.11) 
Whatever gap can be drawn between what Duhem and Quine have said, what is 
unshaken is that Duhem responded to the gap between theory and observation, and 
so did Quine. They both rejected the distinction between theory and observation, 
but each of them rejected that distinction in different ways. They both employed 
holism, though Duhem limits holism by limiting the size of the group of hypotheses 
involved in testing the one hypothesis in question, while Quine leaves this open and 
unlimited. On the basis of this we could argue that we can still construct a version of 
UTE containing some chosen elements from both Quine’s and Duhem’s arguments. 
What is of importance in relation to our discussion, is that they have both, in 
different ways, argued to the conclusion that there is no observation of phenome-
na which is purely observational, without a reliance on background theories. This 
position became known as the theory-ladenness argument, and Quine became es-
tablished as a contemporary empiricist philosopher arguing for theory-ladenness 
and a rejection of a positivist view of empiricism. For he, through this and other 
arguments, has abandoned a positivist view of empiricism.  Quine’s contributions 
to epistemology and philosophy of science, for the most part was based on his in-
sistence on theory-ladenness: that there is no clear division between observational 
sentences, which are assumed to report pure sensory experience without involv-
ing any theory, and non-observation sentences which are theory-laden. This was 
Quine’s move to break away from semantic positivism and epistemological positiv-
ism, which both claimed that all empirical statements are decidable by immediate 
experience.12)
Christopher Boorse (Boorse, 1976: 369 – 387)13) argues that in the thesis of 
indeterminacy Quine only involves the connection to stimulation of the nerve end-
ing, in defining the stimulus meaning, and as a result neglects intersentential con-
nection. He concludes that the thought behind Quine’s unwillingness to involve 
intersentential connections in defining stimulus meaning is the guiding principle 
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that intersentential connections can be constitutive of meaning, only when they re-
sult in an indirect connection to stimulation. What Boorse points to, as an element 
of semantic positivism in Quine’s thought, is the assumption that the meaning of a 
sentence is its sensory consequences.14)
Quine is well-known for his challenge to the positivist movement in his writings 
prior to the indeterminacy thesis. He advocated pragmatism in ‘From a Logical 
Point of View’, which includes his famous attack on logical empiricism in the ‘Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism’, in which Quine attacked the semantic doctrine of the pos-
itivists and concluded that the use of the notion of meaning was indefensible. He 
attacked the link between particular propositions and experience, criticized phil-
osophical analysis aimed at clarifying the meanings of words and sentences, and 
challenged positivist reductionist assumptions, insisting on the view that relations 
between belief and experience have a holistic character. So, it is true to say that 
in Quine’s view, the meaning of a sentence and the truth of an expression are tied 
to experience. It is also true to say that Quine holds a holistic view, contrary to 
semantic positivists. That is, while semantic positivism insists that the meaning of 
a sentence is tied with a particular experience, Quine holds that the meaning of a 
sentence is given in the totality of experience. 
While we recognize that these areas of positivist thought have been targeted 
by Quine’s attack on positivism, one can argue that positivist thought had more 
components than Quine’s criticism allowed. For instance, among many others 
Christopher Hookway (Hookway, 1988: vol. 2)15) argues that one of the positivist 
components which remained untouched by Quine’s criticism is the physicalist view 
of knowledge and reality, that is, the view that: scientific knowledge serves as the 
paradigm for all knowledge; philosophy has to conceive of itself as science; and the 
aim is that of unification of all sciences into a single field of scientific knowledge, 
which is physics.  
What is at issue in Quine’s argument is, that, given extreme linguistic behav-
iourism, can there be an empirically motivated notion of sameness of meaning? 
This is the thought behind Quine’s conclusion: that if all there is to meaning is a 
pattern of stimulus and response, then it would be impossible to discriminate mean-
ings, which are in fact behaviourally indiscriminable though discriminable in other 
terms, and that is reductio ad absurdum. John Searle (Searle, 1987: 123 – 146.) 
argues that although Quine himself doesn’t admit it, his conclusion disproved his 
premises. Both the indeterminacy argument and the inscrutability argument depend 
on the assumption of behaviourism, and the result is refutation of that assumption.16)
Dorit Bar-On (Bar-On, 1987: 123 – 146) questioned this relation between UTE 
and indeterminacy in ‘Semantic Indeterminacy and Scientific Underdetermina-
tion’.17) She accepts that UTE poses a problem for anyone who wants to maintain a 
fully realist attitude toward science, but she writes, the full solution to this problem, 
is either that:
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1 – We are assured that there are grounds for a rational choice between empiri-
cally equivalent theories in order to declare one of the alternatives true. 
Or:
2 – We are allowed to deny there is any theoretical choice to be made, and to 
deny we can have any significant alternatives.
Quine deployed the latter as a strategy in supporting the indeterminacy thesis, 
and this strategy is not only at odds with what Quine wanted to defend in UTE as a 
scientific realist philosopher, but also with Quine’s recent formulation of the UTE 
argument, which “depends on a certain view of theoretical content which is, in ef-
fect, encapsulated by indeterminacy thesis”18), for “Quine’s recent resolutions to the 
UTE problem rely on the view of theoretical content that is contained in the inde-
terminacy thesis”.19) That ‘certain view’ Quine holds is holistic meaning – verifica-
tionist; which is a blend of the ‘Duhem/ Peirce doctrine’: this holds that theoretical 
sentences have meaning as larger blocks of theory and not as single sentences (this 
is Duhem’s theory – Quine says total), while from Charles Sanders Peirce comes 
the doctrine that the meaning of a sentence turns on what evidence it has for its truth 
(Quine takes it to be the total evidence for its truth). The combination of these two 
is what Quine holds, and this is the source of the problem, Dorit Bar – on suggests.
Section three: the ontological relativity
This is one of the major philosophical claims of indeterminacy between dif-
ferent languages; hence, between different societies, cultures, and by its conse-
quence, it applies even between two individuals within the same society and the 
same culture. Quine’s argument leads to ontological relativity; because reference 
is relative to a coordinate system – or a translation scheme – and the coordi-
nate system is provided by the background language, and this differs from one 
language to another. The relativistic thesis Quine holds is that we cannot fully 
interpret a theory from one language to another unless the reference of the ob-
jects described in that theory is fixed upon how the reference of these objects are 
fixed by our own theory. Also translating a theory is doubly relative because that 
translation is relative to the background theory of the language we translate from, 
and is relative to the manual of translation arbitrary selected, given the indeter-
minacy of translation, to translate that theory into ours, or another language.20) 
So translation in this sense is doubly relative. But if Searle is right in saying that 
Quine’s thesis of indeterminacy of translation and inscrutability of reference is 
based on Quine’s behaviourist’s assumption, then if behaviourism is refuted, as 
Searle argued by reductio ad absurdum, the thesis of ontological relativity fails 
too. For what Quine holds as ontological relativity is supported by his two the-
ses of inscrutability and indeterminacy, and if these two theses are supported by 
behaviourism assumption, and the result is refutation of that assumption, then 
Quine’s ontological relativity fails too. 
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Donald Davidson (Davidson, 1979: 7 – 19)21) has rejected ontological relativity, 
and stands against the first-person case, but he kept inscrutability of reference and 
indeterminacy. For on his view the semantic feature of language is a public feature 
and the public feature is subject to indeterminacy, therefore there is no unique ref-
erence. Davidson then makes an appeal to the principal of charity and Tarski- style 
theory of truth to put constraint on meaning. He holds that truth and logical form 
can be indeterminate; even if they are fixed, acceptable theories may still differ with 
respect to the reference they assign to the same words and phrases. On his view 
the only empirical evidence is the fact that speakers ‘hold true’ certain sentences 
in certain situations and that there are alternative ways of matching words with ob-
jects which are inconsistent, but can equally well explain why the speaker holds a 
sentence true. Searle’s argument against indeterminacy and inscrutability, as given 
in relation to Quine’s, stands against Davidson’s acceptance of them.  Searle’s view 
is that both Quine’s and Davidson’s arguments converge and that both arguments 
can be construed as a reductio ad absurdum of the premises they involve, given the 
two theses of inscrutability and indeterminacy are based on a behaviourist assump-
tion. In order for Davidson to accept inscrutability or indeterminacy claims he need 
to hold, as Quine does, the identified assumption of behaviourism- or the added 
hidden premise- to Quine’s argument of indeterminacy. 
Quine’s indeterminacy of translation is controversial, one should not rush to 
accept the full view. After writing ‘Word and Object’ he provoked a high degree 
of discussion and criticism, some of which was based on misreading of versions 
of Quine’s theses. Hence, Quine had to write more on indeterminacy in order to 
clarify what he meant and what he thinks the thesis is. So, he wrote exclusively 
on this issue in ‘On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation’. The criticism 
continued. Quine was invited on many occasions, including at conferences held on 
his philosophy in general, to discuss the thesis further, to reply to his critics, even 
to endorse different definitions of notions such as observation, stimulus meaning, 
and to reconsider his earlier thesis of the underdetermination of theory by evidence.
Quine had a firm standpoint on many other issues in his lifetime of philosoph-
ical writing, some of which he himself reviewed and altered. With this in mind 
many found it useful to read Quine’s thesis of indeterminacy in the light of his other 
philosophical views in relation to other much-debated issues, such as the logical 
positivist movement, physicalism, behaviourism, etc. This was encouraged by two 
observations: one is that there are tensions between Quine’s philosophical views; 
the second is that there is a lack of examples given by Quine for indeterminacy. 
The latter prompted the use of the ‘Gavagai’ example as an indeterminacy example. 
After much discussion and further clarifications in his subsequent writings to the 
effect that the ‘Gavagai’ example is not meant to be used solely for indeterminacy, 
but, for the inscrutability of reference, he provided us with two ways of structuring 
the argument for indeterminacy. He gives us the first premises of each of the two 
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ways indicated by himself: the inscrutability of reference, used as a premise in the 
argument from below, illustrated by the ‘Gavagai’ example; the underdetermina-
tion of theory by evidence, used as a premise in the argument from above, given 
elsewhere in his previous writings. I have presented the ‘Gavagai’ argument as 
Quine has in ‘Word and Object’, then the additional clarifications Quine provided 
in ‘On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation’; the argument from above, 
and the argument from below. We look exclusively at the argument from above and 
the role of the underdetermination of theories by evidence in this argument. 
Further, we looked at whether the argument from above can be sustained, by 
way of the UTE claim which is given by Quine as a first premise for the inde-
terminacy conclusion. Over the dispute about whether Quine’s UTE thesis can 
be attributed to Duhem as much as to Quine, as Quine wishes, we saw that even 
if they can be distinguished as two different versions of UTE, the result will not 
have an impact on the question we have raised: whether we can derive indetermi-
nacy from the UTE premise. For what Quine thought UTE is, has been given as 
a first premise in the indeterminacy argument and his version of UTE is what we 
have in question. We claimed that there is a tension in Quine’s philosophy. We 
have given two ways to read this tension in relation to the indeterminacy claim: 
One way of identifying the tension is presented as the incompatibility between 
UTE and the indeterminacy argument. This incompatibility arises because, on the 
one hand, Quine defended scientific realism through the UTE argument which he 
achieved by legitimizing constraints on empirical inquiries other than evidence 
criteria, such as simplicity, non- contradiction with other true theories, etc., and 
this is different from what is given in the indeterminacy claim. Seeing the tension 
in this way gives a strong impression that Quine’s argument must rely on some 
other unstated premise, or background assumption, which is not defended by 
the UTE argument. This is where Quine’s other views needed to be brought into 
question, such as physicalism, behaviourism, holism, etc. However, in this way 
Quine’s other views cannot rescue the argument for indeterminacy as it is stated 
by the argument from above, it can only clarify that Quine might have assumed in 
addition to the first premise (UTE) behaviourist and physicalist assumption in the 
argument for indeterminacy. Given this, the argument for indeterminacy then can 
be challenged through challenging these assumptions. The argument for indeter-
minacy on this approach fails to derive the indeterminacy conclusion from UTE 
– its first premise – as presented in the argument from above; the other way in 
which the tension is perceived is that, because Quine had difficulty in sustaining 
the UTE argument, he kept changing UTE formulations in order to provide solu-
tions to UTE problems. The UTE formulation Quine had in mind when writing, 
indeterminacy is modified, having no tensions with the indeterminacy argument, 
as the first view above has suggested. This is because by the time Quine wrote 
‘Word and Object’, he had already re-formulated the UTE argument according to 
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the Duhem/Peirce (Peirce, 1955)22) meaning-verificationist view. On this view, 
the indeterminacy Quine claims is already part of UTE, it is built into it. This 
view, while it accommodates the tension between the old formulation of UTE and 
the indeterminacy, presents one possibility of what Quine might have had in mind 
when he thought we could derive indeterminacy from UTE. 
Whatever view we accept, we arrive at the conclusion that the indeterminacy 
claim cannot be sustained as presented by the argument from above. For, if we 
accept the first view, the (old version of) the UTE argument would not take us to 
the indeterminacy conclusion as it is stated by the argument from above, and, if we 
accept the second view, that the UTE argument, presented and used in construct-
ing the indeterminacy argument (and re-formulated differently than the old UTE 
argument) already had the indeterminacy argument built to it, then the argument 
for indeterminacy has a premise circularity, the conclusion already exists in the 
first premise given by Quine as the UTE argument. Either way, if either of these 
two views is true, then the argument from above is not proved; on the first view the 
conclusion does not follow from its premise; on the second view, in addition, the 
argument has premise circularity.
If this is accepted, then we may think that the consequence of this has to be, 
we have to accept that both theories of meaning and scientific theories are under-
determined by evidence. That is, the old formulation of UTE applies to both, or 
both scientific theories and theories of meaning are indeterminate, given the new 
formulation of UTE. But this choice will not arise, for only by accepting the new 
formulation of UTE can we follow an argument for indeterminacy, and by doing 
this, we end up in a kind of premise circularity, because of the indeterminacy part 
which is built into the new formulation of UTE, for this reason we cannot use the 
new formulation. By doing this we will be left with either the old UTE argument or 
something similar or to the same effect. Either way this would not produce Quine’s 
indeterminacy argument as stated in the argument from above, for the same reason 
that the old UTE did not produce indeterminacy.
Conclusion
The indeterminacy claim cannot be sustained, if it was, Quine’s thesis of inde-
terminacy is one arguments that will put each one of us apart into different worlds. 
We can accept the underdetermination of theory by evidence in meaning, but not 
indeterminacy between different languages, nations, social groups, and between 
individuals. Quine changed the formulation of the underdetermination of theory 
by evidence (UTE) argument from what Duhem said to the Quine/Pierce meaning 
verification view, in order use the new formulation of UTE to imply indeterminacy. 
Given that, we see when we apply the old UTE argument we only arrive at underde-
termination of theory by evidence, and that applies to all sciences, philosophy and 
knowledge, including philosophy of language. 
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